The WellSaid Podcast

Bond market opportunities beyond US borders

Episode Summary

On the latest episode of Wellington’s InvestorExchange podcast, host Amar Reganti sits down with Brij Khurana, portfolio manager of an unconstrained bond strategy, to discuss the shifting dynamics of US and global markets, and what they mean for asset allocators.

Episode Notes

On the latest episode of Wellington’s InvestorExchange podcast, host Amar Reganti sits down with Brij Khurana, portfolio manager of an unconstrained bond strategy, to discuss the shifting dynamics of US and global markets, and what they mean for asset allocators.

1:45 – How the US navigated the GFC and COVID pandemic
6:50 – Immigration and labor supply
8:30 – The One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the Fed
11:40 – What’s happening in global capital markets?
14:10 – Applying this to allocations
17:20 – What’s next?

Episode Transcription

BRIJ KHURANA: I think 2025 is monumental in terms of breaking the correlation between the way the dollar trades relative to U.S. stocks. And I think this is very important, because if we look at who owns U.S. assets, almost 26 trillion is owned outside of the U.S. And so I do think there is going to be this, this really thoughtful change in asset allocation that will take place over many, many years, and I think we’re very early in it. From a fixed income perspective, I do think, it makes sense, given just how much supply of bonds are coming out of the government in the U.S., to look more broadly.

AMAR REGANTI: Fifteen years ago, the highly respected British journalist and economist Martin Wolf wrote in the Financial Times, “We already know the earthquake of the past few years has damaged Western economies, while leaving those in emerging companies, particularly Asia, standing. It also has destroyed Western prestige. Wolf goes on: “That epoch is now over. Hitherto, the rules of emerging countries disliked the West’s pretensions, but respected its competence. This is true no longer. Never again will the West have the sole word.”

I’m Amar Reganti, a fixed income strategist and global insurance strategist at Wellington Management. I’m joined today by my colleague Brij Khurana. As the portfolio manager of an unconstrained bond strategy, Brij thinks about the market and economic divergence of global economies a lot. I can think of no one better to discuss the risks and opportunities of diversifying beyond the U.S. bond markets than him. Brij, it’s great to have you. Thanks for joining me on Investor Exchange.

BRIJ KHURANA: Thanks for having me.

AMAR REGANTI: Okay, Brij, I read that quote from 2010, and I think of a few things. I mean, first, I think of you when I read that quote. But even the context of the GFC, the Global Financial Crisis, which originated in the United States, Martin Wolf was wrong, or early, depending on how you look at it. Developed Western economies, particularly the U.S. recovered, and continue to operate competently. U.S. equity markets outpaced their global peers for years. The U.S. dollar was stronger, supporting this thesis of U.S. exceptionalism. And then when, when the COVID-19 pandemic rocked the global economy in 2020, the U.S. policy response served as a model for other countries on how to handle exogenous shocks. Fast forward to 2025, however, and cracks in U.S. dominance appear to be growing. So, first question: was Martin Wolf wrong or early? Do you think that we are now in a period that is unique to capital markets, where on the financial-markets side of things the West has become, or will become, less influential than China and other emerging markets, or, or even, you know, developed markets, non-U.S.?

BRIJ KHURANA: I think it’s really helpful to take a step back and think about why the conventional view — which, actually, Martin Wolf’s view was conventional. I mean, the Global Financial Crisis started in the U.S., so everyone assumed that we would be the worst to deal with it, and that was the complete opposite. As you mentioned, U.S. asset markets vastly outperformed the rest of the world. And I think it’s helpful to think about the different policy responses after the GFC. So you have a worldwide balance sheet recession, and initially you got what you needed: you had a lot of fiscal spending, and you had a lot of monetary spending. That’s, in my view, what you really need to prevent this disinflationary outcome from really taking over the rest of the world. So we did get that, but that changed in the U.S. in 2010, when we had the Budget Sequester Act that pulled some fiscal spending out of the economy, and then you had the peripheral crisis in Europe, and that basically ended spending there, at least from, from the governmental perspective. So why did you have still completely different economic outcomes, with the U.S. growing still quite strong, and Europe really, you know, languishing for almost a decade after that? I think it’s really because of the difference in the way that economies are structured. The U.S. is much more of a capital-markets dominated economy, so when interest rates went lower, companies started borrowing, and even the governments started borrowing, as well, and that kept debt still in the system, and prevent this deleveraging, this nasty deleveraging that we’re so used to.

AMAR REGANTI: Or, move the deleveraging out of the private sector, and allowed the leveraging to take place in the government sector.

BRIJ KHURANA: Correct, exactly. And I think it also didn’t help that you had this cloud infrastructure investment cycle that benefited U.S. companies much more, just given our dominance in that field relative to the rest of the world. You take Europe, on the other hand, it’s got a bank-dominated capital system, and so what that meant is, is when you had this disinflation, rates went to negative, you were basically hurting your engine of growth, and I think that was the main difference in terms of economic outcomes, and one of the reasons that not only you had superior U.S. asset performance, but also superior U.S. dollar performance with capital flowing from abroad to find assets that were actually increasing in price, rather than decreasing.

AMAR REGANTI: What you described in Europe sounds like a classic balance sheet recession that wasn’t combatted in the way that a balance sheet recession should be, with, with fiscal expansion. Then COVID, right? Which, in a way, the U.S., maybe, from a public health perspective, had maybe one of the more uncoordinated responses — it varied across the country, by states and so on. Yet, at the same time, the U.S. economic recovery from COVID was — at least looked, at a top level — substantially better than many parts of the world.

BRIJ KHURANA: When I think about why the U.S. has outperformed since COVID, one view we have on our team is that recessions wipe the slate clean, and that you should have a new set of investment opportunities that result from, basically, a recession. Well, we kind of got the same leadership we had right before then: we had tech outperforming; we had U.S. growth really exceeding. And I would really think it comes down to almost three factors.

The three contributors to U.S. growth since the pandemic have been government spending, immigration, and GPUs, and by that we really mean the AI capex cycle. And so, you know, government spending has been substantial. I think what has been exceptional about the U.S. has been its willingness to run exceptional fiscal deficits, almost seven to eight percent annually since 2020. And that’s very different than the rest of the world, which may not have had the fiscal space to do it, but certainly we were willing to, to push the fiscal purse strings to get growth higher. Similarly, immigration, you know, it’s been about 0.7% annually in terms of growth. That’s really substantial, and, by the way, that has helped increase the labor supply, kept inflation down, so the Fed has been able to cut — not as much as other countries — but has been able to cut as a result of the disinflationary impact of immigration. And the AI capex cycle, which is still, still quite dramatic. You know, that’s almost added 0.7% to 1% of GDP. And so you have these confluence of three events that, if you look at how much we grew last year, at about 2.4%, these three factors actually almost explain all of it. So, I think that’s why we’ve had this U.S. exceptional experience, but I do think there are cracks starting to emerge.

AMAR REGANTI: Right, I want to get to that, then. So, you described a lot of things that have led us to the current place. Where do you see things going for the broader economy sort of in the here and now and going forward, at least in the near and intermediate term?

BRIJ KHURANA: So when I think about the U.S., immigration has been one of the main reasons. It’s added about 0.7% annually. I think that is starting to change, obviously, and so you think about whether or not we are going to be in a more persistently inflationary environment as a result of what we’re doing on the immigration side in the U.S. I think that’s a real risk.

AMAR REGANTI: Just lower supply.

BRIJ KHURANA: Lower labor supply. Same thing on tariffs. I mean, tariffs, effectively, is inflationary but growth shock. It’s a stagflationary policy, because you’re increasing import good prices, but it’s a tax on the consumer. And so I do think that that is another way that we’re kind of getting into this worse inflation, lower growth tradeoff in the U.S. when you think about government spending, look, we just got the One Big Beautiful Bill, and so it is certainly an expansion of government spending, so that has not slowed down. That being said, I do think this stimulus is going to be different than a lot of the COVID stimulus, in two ways. One, this is more of a regressive source of taxation, compared to the other ones, in the sense that, you know, more of the savings are going to accrue to higher-income consumers, who, by the way, save it; they’re not going to spend it as much as lower-income consumers. And then you — when you combine that with tariffs, you know, tariffs are, also somewhat regressive in the sense that people who spend more of their money on goods, prices, are going to feel the impact of that, as well. So you have these two things where you’re basically taxing the consumers who are most likely to spend. So I’m not sure it’s going to be as stimulative as other —

AMAR REGANTI: — So you think the fiscal multiplier’s positive here, but, but modest.

BRIJ KHURANA: Lower, exactly —

AMAR REGANTI: Yeah.

BRIJ KHURANA: — lower than —

AMAR REGANTI: Oh, okay.

BRIJ KHURANA: — we’ve seen in the past. And I think markets are, are kind of assuming that it’s going to look like a lot in the past. I talk about government spending not being as substantial, and you are going to get some tariff revenues to offset some of the spending, you have immigration, which is slowing, then it really comes down to the AI capex cycle, which, by the way, has not slowed, and looks like it’s accelerating, but I think there’s still a lot of question marks about that, given the DeepSeek news, etc.

AMAR REGANTI: We’re recording this after the passage of the bill. We didn’t time it that way, but it kind of worked out that way. How’s the bond market reacted, from your seat, in terms of the passage of the bill? In the way you expected, or, or unexpected?

BRIJ KHURANA: Bond yields have certainly moved higher call it almost 25 basis points. They’ve moved higher since the passage of the bill, or at least the real indications that it was going to get through, which I do think is reasonable. I do think that there’s some offsetting points for why bonds aren’t reacting the same way they did. I think there is more uncertainty about tariffs. I think the market’s kind of looking past those in a way that, you basically had the three things at the same time happening. You had all the immigration policies, you had tariffs, and you also had the Big Beautiful Bill coming through the pipe. So, all of that caused more bond market jitters in April and May than today. You know, I also think we’ve just been lucky in that we’ve had lower inflation prints over the last, last few months, and I also think that, with speculation on who the new Fed chair is going to be bond market’s looking forward and saying, well, yes, rates are high now, and the back end of the curve can be completely unrelated to the front end of the curve, but, at the same time, you are going to have a chairperson who’s probably going to be cutting rates next year, which this, this Fed’s probably not going to do. So I think the bond market’s kind of looking through the Big Beautiful Bill to some degree.

AMAR REGANTI: Yeah, well, I mean, you’re an active manager. Do, do you agree with the bond market? How do you think about that, and, you know, what it affects in your sort of day-to-day positioning, of what you work on? Yeah.

BRIJ KHURANA: I think, regardless of who the Fed chair is, they’re going to have a tough time cutting if you’re getting, you know, 0.6, 0.7 percent stimulus from the government side next year.
At the same time, you are getting continued AI capex spending, which could be at one percent of GDP. And so if you’re just sitting on that, even if we do get some consumer slowdown, you’re still looking at healthy levels of real growth. And I do think the Supreme Court kind of established Fed independence, and so a lot of people are going to say what they need to get the job, but then, push comes to shove, when you’re responsible for inflation and the economy, you’re probably going to be reluctant to cut when growth is as stimulative as it is. —The interest rate-sensitive parts of the economy have slowed. If we look at housing, it is slowing pretty dramatically. In the labor market, it’s almost an interesting dynamic where I think the labor demand is quite weak. When we think about where we’re cutting, you know, jobs, you know, 50% of jobs in the last few years have basically come from healthcare, education, and government, which is basically all the areas that are experiencing some level of slowdown, at least over the next four years. And so, to me, that does speak to worse labor demand, but then if you also curb immigration you also have worse labor supply. So you could be in an environment with lower job growth, but you also have a relatively low unemployment rate. And, once again, is the Fed going to start saying, well, I need to start cutting rates when the unemployment rate’s 4.1%, which is where we are today?

AMAR REGANTI: Right.

BRIJ KHURANA: That seems like a tough thing for them to do.

AMAR REGANTI: — and, look, to people listening, neither Brij and I are lawyers, but, the case he’s referring to is Trump v. Wilcox, where, early on, in their opinion, the Supreme Court made a special carve-out, it appeared, for the Federal Reserve and its members, the FOMC, at least, in terms of whether or not the Executive Branch has authority to, to relieve them of their duties. Returning back to what else is happening in capital markets, so that’s the U.S. What about what we see across both our oceans here?

BRIJ KHURANA: I think Trump has catalyzed a lot of spending globally, and, you know, I think that is a big change, which is why, as much as I do think U.S. growth can overall slow (outside of government spending slightly — although the multiplier’s not going to be there — and AI spending), I do think that if you look at the rest of the world, though, we have been in an environment where there’s been too little fiscal profligacy, and I think that is certainly changing. If you go to Europe, and you see Germany, what they’ve announced, in terms of their fiscal spending plans, are basically the largest since reunification. And not only it’s the largest in terms of size; it’s also in terms of years of which this incremental spending, in terms of either military or, or energy infrastructure, whatever it is, there’s a lot of spending going on in Europe, and —

AMAR REGANTI: — so, you think of that as a structural, going-forward change to definitely Germany, possibly Europe, and, likewise, probably to German bond markets?

BRIJ KHURANA: Correct. What we’ve seen in the last few years is that global bond markets have done much better than the U.S. bond market, because U.S. growth has been much stronger, and the inflation’s been more sticky. I do think you could see somewhat of a convergence take place over time, where U.S. yields, if the cycle is slowing more dramatically, and the rest of the world is starting to see a much more improving cycle, I think you should see that in bond yields. And, you know, quite frankly, U.S. fixed income since 2022 has not been a really good diversifier to equity exposure, but it’s because the U.S. cycle has been so strong. I think people could start to re-look at bonds again if you’re not seeing the same growth-inflation cycle we’ve seen before.

AMAR REGANTI: And I don’t want to extrapolate too much, but, to me, that sounds like lower U.S. rates, weaker U.S. dollar probably, too?

BRIJ KHURANA: Yeah, that’s also been the opposite of what we’ve seen over the last few years, which has been higher U.S. rates, and a stronger dollar. I do think that’s the case. I think within U.S. fixed income, as much as, you know, I do think you could have a lower cycle, I do think that this is an attractive environment for some parts of U.S. fixed income that are trading at attractive yields, like agency mortgage bonds. They trade at about 5.5% to 5.75% yields. They tend to do better when volatility in interest rate markets is coming down, and also we are in more of a rangebound yield environment. I think if yields get much higher, it’s going to slow the cycle because of housing, etc., and that should create a cap on yields. At the same time, if yields go much lower, I do think, you know, we’ll continue to see a lot of spending, and the cycle could reignite. And so in this yield-bound environment, they tend to do pretty well, and I also think you’re also going to see bank capital reform coming through, and banks are sitting on a lot of excess capital right now that could be deployed into securities, particularly what we’re seeing on the supplementary leverage ratio, announcements.

AMAR REGANTI: This segues nicely into thinking about allocations. So, you know, there is thematically this discussion around global reserve managers of not necessarily de-dollarizing but probably diversifying a bit more. From your perspective, you know, sort of agnostic of channel, what’s the best way to do that in fixed income, from an unconstrained perspective?

BRIJ KHURANA: When we think about 2022, I mentioned how it broke the conventional correlation between stocks and bonds. I think 2025 is as monumental in terms of breaking the correlation between the way the dollar trades relative to U.S. stocks. And I think this is very important, because if we look at who owns U.S. assets, almost 26 trillion is owned outside of the U.S. And, you know, a large part of this, particularly on the equity side, actually, is unhedged, meaning that they are willing to take the currency exposure. Most foreigners actually hedge their fixed income exposure — it’s not as volatile. I do think you’re going to see this environment where reserve managers, broadly, are going to start to rethink how much of their U.S. equity sensitivity they have, in the sense that, you know, they had basically bought U.S. assets unhedged, because if they went down, if stocks went down, the dollar would go up, and they would be fine. And so I do think there is going to be this, this really thoughtful change in, in asset allocation that will take place over many, many years, and I think we’re very early in it. From a fixed income perspective, I do think, it makes sense, given just how much supply of bonds are coming out of the government in the U.S., to look more broadly, to look at countries with better fiscal houses, to be quite frank, whether or not it’s countries like Norway, Australia, New Zealand, you know, they have very low levels of government debt. They do have weaker economic cycles because in many of these countries they have variable rate mortgage markets, and so consumers are feeling the pinch already of high, high rates. And so if we do see almost a slower U.S. cycle, I would argue that these could benefit more.

AMAR REGANTI: Okay, well, what, what portions of the bond market do you think are just generally overlooked, like, way too often?

BRIJ KHURANA: I mean, that’s really what we try to do, actually — our key philosophy is trying to find assets that have been overlooked by markets where there is a structural change that has just been underappreciated. And I think the asset class that best represents that for me is emerging market local bonds, so these are bonds that are, from EM countries that are denominated in their own currency, so it would be Mexico issuing bonds in pesos as an example. And if I looked at that in the prior cycle — let’s call it from the GFC to COVID — it really was an awful asset class. It produced almost, you know, 2% returns for 13% volatility, so the worst of the worst within fixed income. And I think what people missed in 2022 is that emerging market countries were having a much more orthodox economic policy mix in response to COVID than the developed world.

They didn’t do helicopter money. They certainly didn’t spend fiscally the way we did in the developed world. And now, EM does not have an inflation problem, which I think is, is quite striking, that emerging market inflation levels are, are basically back to where they were pre-COVID, for the most part. And so, on the rate side, they have much more room to cut, and real yields are still extraordinarily high — in many countries 6% to 8% percent, which is crazy. But then also, on the foreign exchange side, as well, EMFX tends to do the best when the global cycle’s doing well, but the U.S. cycle might be slowing, and that means the Fed is not as hawkish as they typically are. So I think we’re starting to get that happening, and so, it could be a really good environment for EM local assets.

AMAR REGANTI: What else would keep us up at night and what keeps you optimistic about the future?

BRIJ KHURANA: You know, in some ways, it’s the same thing, in the sense that, you know, what makes me worried is that I look at the increase in debt over the past few decades — it’s just not since COVID, it’s been for the last few decades — and it’s been on the corporate side, it’s been on the government side. It’s just this overall increase in debt in the U.S., and it hasn’t been towards what I would call productive means. It’s been towards just juicing consumption higher.

AMAR REGANTI: So not stock of debt, necessarily, but what the financing is being deployed towards.

BRIJ KHURANA: Correct, exactly.

AMAR REGANTI: Yeah.

BRIJ KHURANA: And that’s left the U.S. because we’ve had such a strong economy, with this consumption-fueled debt. It’s left the economy very wealthy, but, I would argue, not terribly productive. And I think the hope for policymakers right now is maybe AI’s going to create this hugely productive economy that can allow us to grow out of the debt troubles that I think we’ve created for ourselves. So that’s — I think that’s what keeps me up at night.

AMAR REGANTI: I’m not skeptical necessarily, but we’ve been in markets long enough also to know that, you know, putting all your eggs in one productivity idea has not historically been a great trade.

BRIJ KHURANA: I think there are things that do keep me optimistic about the future, and they are also actually related to productivity. If you’d asked me before, before COVID, honestly, what would the U.S. need to really get more capital in the economy and be more productive, I would’ve told you three things. I would’ve said you needed higher real rates to incentivize investment and good capital decisions. You would also need, actually, more balanced trade, with the U.S. consuming less domestically, and the world consuming more. I think that’s important, too. And then I would also say, more competition domestically. And on the latter point, I don’t know what the impact is going to be from a productivity standpoint, but from a competitive standpoint I think it’s actually going to be really helpful, you know, moats are coming down pretty quickly. I think in the crypto landscape, as well, moats are coming down pretty quickly. And so, creating a more competitive U.S. economy is the way to get more productivity into it, over the long term. So, you know, I do think we are moving along the path from a policy standpoint that will eventually get us there. I’m hopeful — that’s what I’m optimistic about — but it does seem like we’ve taken on a lot of debt to get to this potential solution, and, and we’ll have to see — how it evolves.

AMAR REGANTI: That was, as always with you, a fantastic discussion. Brij, thank you for joining the Investor Exchange.

BRIJ KHURANA: Thanks for having me, Amar.

Views expressed are those of the speaker(s) and are subject to change. Other teams may hold different views and make different investment decisions. For professional/institutional investors only. Your capital may be at risk. Podcast produced August 2025.

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